In all European countries, emergency policy measures have been introduced in order to counteract the employment consequences of the economic crisis. In the context of variously composed anticrisis packages, many European countries have used Short-Time Work (STW) schemes, that is measures to subsidize a temporary reduction in working time intended to maintain an employment relationship. Countries which already had STW schemes, such as Kurzarbeit in Germany and Austria and the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) in Italy, have loosened the eligibility requirements and extended their maximum duration. This paper focuses on the issue whether the economic crisis has spurred any convergence in the use of STW in these three social-insurance countries -Austria, Germany and Italy -or whether policy change has rather occurred in a path-dependent fashion. In order to do so, the paper also adopts a systemic approach, focusing on relationships of complementarity or functional substitution and equivalence among the various schemes comprising income maintenance systems to tackle the risks of partial or total unemployment. In addition to shedding light on a rather under-researched province of contemporary welfare states such as STW, this article also aims to contribute to the debate on the analytical levels in the study of social policy by showing the relevance and potential of adopting an intermediate level of analysis between a regime-centred and a programme-centred approach.
Introduction
As the crisis started to hit their economies, all European countries adopted more or less comprehensive policy packages in order to sustain employment levels, offset the social consequences of the crisis, and enhance firms competitiveness (Eurofound 2009; European Commission 2010) . The actual composition of anti-crisis packages differed widely across Europe by type of intervention (Pisani-Ferry and Van Pottelsberghe 2009 ) and financial effort (Watt 2009 ).
Most countries, though, have adopted measures to subsidize temporary reductions in working time, by strengthening existing programmes or introducing brand new ones (Arpaia et al. 2010 , Eurofound 2010 . Following the terminology in use, we refer to these schemes as Short-Time Work (STW) . As compared to other instruments of income support, STW is fundamentally aimed at avoiding the dissolution of employment relationships. Its political attractiveness thus results from the fact that it allows to maintain employment levels. However, it is a discretionary measure, in that the concession of benefits does not automatically stem from the emergence of a social risk but is rather dependent on approval on the part of the public authority. Also, it is generally employers -or in certain cases, works councils -, rather than workers to file a request for the concession of benefits. On the whole, STW does not constitute an individual social right for workers. STW schemes can nonetheless be framed as part of the broader income mantainance system in many welfare states, and especially in Bismarckian ones, within and outside Europe.
It seems interesting to analyze comparatively the strategies of use of STW during the economic crisis which started in 2008. We do so upon the theoretical presumption that an exogenous shock of such magnitude could bear the 'capacity' (Cartwright 1994 ) to trigger processes of change able to overcome differing institutional legacies, and to induce phenomena of policy convergence in advanced capitalist countries. This article focuses in particular on the issue of whether there has been convergence in the use of STW in three social-insurance countries -Austria, Germany and Italy -where it has been in place for decades but has always served quite different purposes, or whether policy change has rather occurred in a path-dependent fashion.
In Italy, STW has constituted an inherent part of the post-war unemployment compensation system.
To be precise, it has been the pivotal scheme of income protection, at least for workers in the core sectors of the economy. In Austria, STW has been in place for some forty years, but the presence of functionally equivalent schemes has limited its scope and institutional importance. Germany seems an intermediate case, in which STW has long been an important element in the income maintenance system in case of no or reduced employment, but it has been traditionally used with a very specific political economic purpose, namely that of hoarding skilled labour in firms in the face of strong fluctuations of product demand.
In fact, STW displays a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a social policy instrument, aimed at supporting worker income in case of joblessness. On the other hand, it is intended to allow firms to retain highly trained workforce, so as to avoid human capital dispersion as a consequence of redundancies. As such, STW constitutes an industrial policy instrument, particularly in those models of capitalism, such as the German, which rely on the production and reproduction of assetspecific skills (Estevez Abe et al 2001 , Thelen 2001 . From a theoretical point of view, therefore, one can expect relevant differences in the configuration, development and effective use of STW in countries belonging to different varieties of capitalism. A good deal of institutional difference between STW schemes in Italy, on the one hand, and Austria and Germany on the other hand can be understood in this way.
Despite differences in their institutional design and role, STW schemes have constituted the principal policy instrument for counteracting the employment crisis in all three countries, including Austria in a rather unprecedented manner. Governments have implemented policy adjustments to such schemes in order to modify their conditions of use, which made them prima facie more similar than could have been expected on the grounds of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hancké et al 2007) . However, the assessment of convergence in the functioning and use of STW schemes becomes more blurred if, rather than considering STW schemes per se, a systemic approach is adopted, whereby the analysis focuses on relationships of complementarity or functional substitution and equivalence among the various schemes comprising income maintenance systems to tackle the risks of partial or total unemployment (Kvist 1998) . When seen under these analytical lenses, STW schemes still perform persistently divergent functions in the three countries.
In addition to shedding light on a rather under-researched province of contemporary welfare states, this article also aims to contribute to the debate on the analytical levels in the study of social policy by showing the relevance and potential of adopting an intermediate level of analysis between a regime-centred and a programme-centred approach (Hinrichs 2000) .
Next section discusses our analytical proposal and provides an institutional contextualization of STW. Section 3 adopts a programme approach in order to describe the institutional features of STW schemes in Italy, Germany and Austria prior to the economic crisis, while section 4 focuses on the STW within the income-maintenance system in the three countries. Section 5 compares the main policy adjustments enacted in the three countries during the crisis. The paper concludes interpreting the different policy responses in the light of institutional complementarities, investigating whether convergence in the use of STW can be ascertained, despite different policy legacies.
Short-time work in different institutional arrangements
Although widely used in the latest crisis, as in previous ones, STW schemes have been relatively STW provides a wage replacement allowance in order to compensate a temporary reduction in working time set in place in order to ensure the continuity of an existing employment relationship.
STW schemes can generally cover two distinct types of risks: conjunctural crises -stemming from temporary downturns, thus limited in time and consequences -and structural crises, due to lengthier processes of firm restructuring which may still result in future redundancies.
While employees may chiefly regard STW as an instrument of job security, from the employers' point of view STW allows the management to hoard labour -in particular, skilled workers -during temporary downturns without incurring in turnover costs: dismissal costs on the one hand, and costs pertaining to recruiting and training new workforce after weathering the storm on the other hand.
As already mentioned, detectable differences can be expected in the institutional design and role performed by STW in a given country's political economy, according to which variety of capitalism it belongs to:
• in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), characterized by general skills, low employment protection and low UB, STW can be expected to play a residual role, as firms do not need to retain but a small portion of trained workforce and will generally opt for (external) numerical flexibility as the most convenient strategy. In these countries, STW actually take the shape of temporary lay-offs, during which workers count as unemployed;
• in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), the enabling role of the state (Kitschelt and Streeck 2003) and cooperative industrial relations push firms to seek for consensual plantlevel strategies during downturns, in order to retain their skilled workforce and maintain employment. This takes place on the background of relatively strict dismissal protection and the diffusion of asset-specific skills in the core workforce which makes workers costly to train and less interchangeable than in LMEs. STW performs the function of helping firms retaining their skilled workforce, while comparatively generous UB and activation measures provide an active safety net for workers made redundant;
• Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) constitute a hybrid model, in which a dualistic production system, with a minority of large manufacturing companies and a diffuse layer of micro-and small enterprises, creates multiple differentiations in terms of needed skills (Regini 1997) . Hence, MMEs are associated to a fragmented configuration of varying levels of job protection and UB, pertaining to specific segments of the workforce (Molina and Rhodes 2007) . Given adversarial industrial relations and a pervasive role of the state (Schmidt 2002) , STW is oversized as compared to CMEs as its resources are used as currency of 'political exchange' between the social partners and parties in government for the purpose of maintaining the income of core workforce (Pizzorno 1978) . Its interaction with UB results, in turn, dysfunctional for workers in small and micro-firms and for nonstandard workers in large firms, whose skills are arguably inessential for firms during crises, thus making them the principal object of (external) numerical flexibility.
Although the VoC approach provides useful insights in broadly understanding the role of STW schemes in different political economy regimes, its utility seems limited when one intends to consider the possibility of policy change induced by exogenous shocks, as it was the case of the 2008 financial crisis. The VoC approach naturally leans towards emphasizing persistence, insofar as actors' expectations are patterned and stabilized by existing institutions, which -as regards welfare institutions -are basically the outcome of production necessities (hence the concept of welfare production regime: see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001 , Iversen 2005 . Given these premises, shocks will be absorbed within each political economy regime, inducing largely path-dependent policy change.
The analytical level and the theoretical tenets of the VoC approach tend to pre-structure, metaempirically, the answer to the question whether massive exogenous shocks can induce policy convergence in countries belonging to different political economy regimes, or (both product and process) policy innovations tend to be incremental. In the light of this, we find it particularly promising, for heuristic purposes, to adopt a middleground perspective between the one focused on regimes and that focused on single social policy schemes. Following an early intuition by Kvist (1998) , this analytical perspective can be identified as a systemic one, focusing on the various measures that empirically contribute to fulfil given social needs, and on the relations that occur between them, be they of functional complementarity, overlapping, or substitution. In this paper, adopting a system approach entails focusing on the overall income maintenance system in case of no or reduced employment, comprised of various programmes in addition to the STW, notably unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, but also social assistance, and even temporary suspension schemes. We will thus ascertain whether possible convergence in the policy design of specific measures such as STW schemes is matched by convergence in the role played by such measures in the overall system, or whether there could be convergence at the specific programme level, coupled with persisting divergence at the system level, although with a less abstract focus than the one implied by a (political economy) regime approach.
In order to do so, it is however necessary to sketch out the design and institutional features of STW in Italy, Austria and Germany as they were regulated before the changes introduced to counteract the economic crisis. While such changes will be analyzed in section 5, it is the functioning of STW before the crisis that has moulded its role in each country's income maintenance system.
STW before the crisis
In all the countries considered, conjunctural STW schemes have long been inherent parts of the income maintenance system in case of non employment Upon these shared basis, we can provide a better understanding of the country-specific features of STW schemes before the changes introduced to counteract the employment crisis. Table 1 below provides a synoptic view on the institutional aspects of greater difference: eligibility rules for firms and workers, generosity in terms of length and wage replacement level, and costs for firms.
To begin with, Kurzarbeit schemes in Germany and Austria are accessible to all types of firm, regardless of their size classes or economic sector. In Italy, both conjunctural (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria, CIGO) and structural (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria, CIGS) STW are reserved to particular sectors, such as industry, constructions, agriculture and related craft firms, whereas CIGS introduces a further exclusion mechanism, by restricting eligibility to firms with more than 15 employees 6 . By contrast, in Germany and Austria firms must have exhausted all other alternative options (holidays, work-sharing arrangements, etc.) before accessing Kurzarbeit.
Moreover, Germany sets a double requirement as at least one third of the workforce in a plant must be affected by a reduction of no less than 10% of monthly salary. In Austria working hours could be reduced only up to 80% 7 . Also, while in Italy CIG constitutes a separated fund vis-à-vis the unemployment insurance fund, in German and Austria financial resources are drawn from a single fund. This helps understanding some of the following differences in terms of generosity for workers and of costs for firms.
In general, the Italian CIG appears comparatively more generous in replacement rates and length of benefits than the German and Austrian Kurzarbeit. CIG replaces up to 80% of the wage as opposed to 60% of ordinary unemployment benefits, while in Austria and Germany there is no difference between the two schemes in this respect. Ceilings are however applied to hourly wage replacements both to CIG and to UB in Italy, so that the actual replacement rates will result considerably lower than the nominal ones for many beneficiaries 8 . Moreover, if the length of CIGO is as short as the Austrian Kurzarbeit (3 months), and in any case -when taking into account all possible extensionsless generous than the German Kurzarbeit (12 months against 24), the maximum length of CIGS by far exceeds all other schemes (up to 48 months, including all extensions) 9 .
Costs of STW for employers are also lower in Italy. True, a firm eligible for CIGS has to pay an overall contribution of 4.71% for CIGO, CIGS, and UB, higher than an Austrian (3%) or a German firm (3.25% till 2007, then 2.1% following the Hartz reforms)
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. The difference lies in the costs for firms upon usage. When using STW, the only cost for employers is a special contribution to the STW insurance which is never higher than 8% of the STW benefit. Social contributions are completely taken over by INPS (and thus the state) for the part exceeding a flat-rate contribution paid by workers. In Germany and Austria employers incur in much higher costs. In Germany they are charged with the total amount of social contributions (including the employee's share) for the first 6 months, albeit calculated on 80% of the wage corresponding to non-worked hours; in Austria, thanks to collective agreements, this takes place on the entire wage corresponding to non-worked hours 11 . Moreover, in both countries collective agreements at the firm level may -and generally do -provide that the employer tops up the benefit.
Finally, the Italian CIG stands out for the discretionary role assigned to the public authority.
Consultation with works councils is mandatory for a CIG request to be filed. Nonetheless, an agreement between the social partners at the firm level is not binding for the concession of benefits, 7 Both provisions have been changed in the context of anti-crisis interventions. 8 To provide an example, a worker whose monthly gross salary amounts to € 1,800 is entitled to a gross benefit of € 892,96 in 2010, if receiving full-time wage compensation. In this case, the real replacement rate results below 50%. 9 Lengths modified in Germany and Austria in the context of anti-crisis interventions. 10 As an anti-crisis measure, in order to rebate labor costs the unemployment insurance contribution (equally divided between employer and employee) has been further lowered from 4.2% to 2.8%, in view of a stabilization at the level of 3% as of 2011. 11 Provisions changed in the context of anti-crisis interventions in both Austria and Germany.
as it is a tripartite committee at the local level chaired by representatives of the Labour Ministry which ultimately decides over the granting of CIG, and negotiates possible extensions, on a caseby-case basis. By contrast, in Austria and Germany the gatekeepers of the whole process are instead the works council, whose agreement is mandatory for an STW request to be valid, also by virtue of the co-decision powers of trade unions. Table 1 about here To sum up already at the programme level Italy's CIG displays rather peculiar features as compared to its Austrian and German counterparts. However, it is the systemic placement of STW schemes in the overall institutional framework of income compensation systems to make a real difference between Italy, on the one hand, and Germany and Austria, on the other. This is what we turn to in the next section.
A systemic approach: STW and income maintenance
The cases of Italy, Germany and Austria display different models of institutional interplay between STW and unemployment benefit systems, albeit on the grounds of a similar insurance-based logic.
In fact, the Italian CIG has traditionally worked as a functional substitute for a weak UB system, which also provides for no general minimum income scheme. By contrast, German and Austrian Kurzarbeit seems to exert a complementary function to a comprehensive set of UB, despite some differences between the two cases.
Italy
Italy features a UB system exclusively centred on social insurance, accompanied by neither unemployment assistance nor any generalized social assistance scheme. Table 2 below provides the institutional characteristics of the main existing schemes. Ordinary unemployment benefits (indennità di disoccupazione a requisiti pieni, OUB) are formally accessible to all dependent workers, with the exception of apprentices and independent contractors, the latter being considered as self-employed. In fact, as Berton et al (2009) show, the fulfilment of a double eligibility threshold (insurance seniority coupled with accrued contributions) constitutes a severe barrier to new entrants in the labour market as well as to workers with discontinuous employment histories stemming from non-standard employment: although formally entitled, only 40% of fixed-term workers, and as little as a third of TAW manage to receive such benefit when becoming unemployed. Wage replacement rates were raised in 2007, but as compared to CIGO (12 months) and CIG (4 years), benefit length is shorter: 8 months maximum (12 for elder workers).
Although targeted at discontinuous workers (fixed-term, TAW and seasonal workers), the scheme with reduced eligibility requirements (indennità di disoccupazione a requisiti ridotti, RUB) maintains a fully-fledged social insurance logic. While the contributory requirement is sensibly diminished, the insurance seniority requirement remains unvaried. As a matter of fact, RUB is not a proper unemployment scheme, but rather some ex-post monetary compensation for unemployment spells. Beneficiaries receive a lump-sum allowance proportional to the number of days worked in the year before that of claim, irrespective of their current employment status.
All in all, almost 40% of fixed-term workers and half of TAW do not get any kind of benefit when they become unemployed (ibid.). As mentioned, there is no minimum income scheme, thus those who do not qualify for either FUB or RUB are left without any resources from the welfare state. Table 2 about here Besides other schemes earmarked to agricultural and construction workers, a non-rights based scheme stands out in the Italian unemployment compensation system: mobility allowance (indennità di mobilità). This very generous scheme (particularly in terms of length) caters only to those open-ended workers made redundant by large industrial firms, typically as a consequence of the exhaustion of CIGS benefits or of collective dismissals. It does not qualify as a proper social right, as it is subject to the same procedures as CIG, and therefore to a discretional approval on the part of the public authority.
To summarize, the traditional configuration of institutional complementarities in the Italian welfare system leans towards the prominence of STW as a functional substitute for a defective set of automatic and inclusive UB, to the sole advantage of workers in the more unionized sectors. On the firm side, STW constitutes an instrument of internal flexibility against the background of the strictest regulation in the OECD as regards collective dismissals.
Germany
Contrary to what happens in Italy, German Kurzarbeit provides no better treatment than unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld, ALG I), as shown in table 3 below. Moreover, a stronger emphasis on active labour market policies is ideally meant to provide workers with job opportunities and skills upgrading in the view of employment transitions. Also from the standpoint of coverage, the German UB system is more inclusive than the Italian one. Eligibility to ALG I requires a contributory record of one year in the last two, but no insurance seniority. Moreover, a voluntary opt-in to unemployment insurance has been available since 2006 to self-employed workers who fulfil some conditions (basically, having been previously insured by virtue of a qualifying job). On the other hand, the 2005 Hartz reforms markedly reduced the length of ALG I especially for older workers 12 . Finally, unlike Italy, Germany has in place a comprehensive social assistance package, comprised of a minimum income scheme for those unable to work (Sozialhilfe) on the one hand, and social assistance for jobseekers and their families (Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende) on the other. The latter is comprised of Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II), which replaced in 2005 the old unemployment assistance and merged it with social assistance for those able to work, and a benefit (Sozialgeld) which can be accessed by family members unable to work of ALG II recipients 13 . Table 3 about here Scholars however point at the dualization between core standard workers covered by ALG I, and discontinuous workers employed with non-standard contracts, especially TAW and 'marginal workers', who are more likely to fall on social assistance in case of unemployment (Palier and Thelen 2010, Eichhorst and Marx 2011) 14 .
Austria
STW has traditionally played a limited role in Austria, as compared to Germany and Italy. This is due to the configuration of income maintenance system in Austria, which provides alternatives to Kurtzarbeit which are better valued by the employers. In particular, temporary suspension arrangements (Aussetzverträge) are a functional equivalent to STW. These consist in a voluntary agreement between employees and their employer to terminate the employment relationship in time 12 As contrasted to the pre-Hartz system, when workers aged over 47 could collect benefits up to a maximum (depending on one's contributory record) of 32 months, now the maximum is set at 15 months for workers over 50, up to 24 for those over 58. 13 The scheme for jobseekers and their families now takes the lion's share of social assistance beneficiaries: in 2008 5 out of 5.2 million people on social assistance were receiving either ALG II or Sozialgeld (Huster et al. 2009 ). 14 In Germany and Austria marginal workers are those employed in so-called mini-jobs, i.e. with part-time contracts below given wage ceilings (400 € /month in Germany; 366,33 € /month in Austria) and reduced social contributions and entitlements (among which no entitlement to unemployment insurance).
of crisis and re-establish it during good weather. The agreement can entail a unilateral obligation on the part of the employer only, or be binding also for the employee. In the latter case, if the employee later refuses to resume the work relationship, entitlement to some severance payments (such as the end-of-service allowance) can be lost. Suspension arrangements are far more attractive to the employers than STW. They are cheaper for them, as workers register with the AMS as normal unemployed and income support is provided by unemployment insurance or social assistance, so employers do not pay any social contributions for the workers suspended. Besides, employers are forced neither to prove their economic condition before the public authority and bear administrative costs, nor to enter negotiations with works councils.
Not only is there a well-oiled functional equivalent to STW, but Austrian workers can access a more encompassing income maintenance system than the German and Italian ones (see Table 4 ).
Compulsory unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosenversicherung) covers all dependent workers and, since 2008, also Freie DienstnehmerInnen, economically dependent workers which the law equates to dependent ones. The other self-employed can opt-in to the scheme, paying voluntary contributions. The sole workers not covered by unemployment insurance are marginal workers 15 .
Upon exahusting unemployment insurance, workers can access means-tested unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe), in principle for an unlimited length (conditional to activation of the beneficiary). Finally, a brand new nation-wide minimum income scheme (Mindestsicherung) will progressively replace the former scheme (Sozialhilfe) which was administered by Länder according to local-specific regulations. significantly eroded increases occurred in previous years (see Table 6 ). By the same token, Italy's unemployment rates rose during 2010, while they stabilized in Austria and receded in Germany (Table 7) .
Tab. 5 about here
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Tab. 7 about here Yet, it seems plausible to say that in all three countries unemployment rates would have been higher if governments had not resorted to STW schemes in such an extensive way as they actually did. All three countries introduced adjustments in order to render such schemes more accessible and flexible. Austria and Germany modified rules in such a way that made their STW somewhat more 'Italian', in terms of length and costs for employers. At the same time, Italy flanked adjustments to the traditional CIG with a vast array of exemptions to existing rules, attempting to fix the holes in the coverage of the income maintenance system through existing discretionary instruments, without creating new social rights.
Italy
In order to counteract the employment consequences of the crisis, the Italian government The introduction of the AD ('emergency' CIG, 'emergency' MA) clearly constitutes a major institutional innovation in Italian labour market policy. First, the extension of CIG and MA entitlement to the majoritarian layer of small firms (which had never contributed to the CIG fund, so that AD are completely funded out of the general revenue) may shift such schemes away from large industrial firms and their workers. Second, the inclusion of all non-standard employees among the workers eligible for AD seems to pave the way for the opening of schemes typically reserved to standard workers such as CIG and MA. However, no changes were made to eligibility requirements with respect to firm seniority (see tables 1 for CIG and 2 for MA). Also, the granting of benefits must be authorized by the regional authorities, while benefit length is regulated by regional tripartite agreements, conditionally on actual availability of resources in the regional budgets (resources for AD are given to the regions after rounds of negotiations with the Treasury).
Beside the institutional innovation of AD, 'regular' CIG has actually constituted the main labour market policy instrument during the crisis. As the amount of available financial resources was increased by the state intervention, evaluation of admissibility has presumably become looser, and firms were allowed to extend and cumulate the length of CIGO and CIGS beyond their normal limits.
Not surprisingly, given these premises, the use of CIG during the crisis has been considerable: the number of authorized hours was, in 2009 and 2010, five times higher than in previous years ( Figure   1 ). This translated, in October 2010, into some 600,000 full-time equivalent workers enrolled in STW, roughly 2.5% of the entire workforce. • Eligibility conditions for firms were loosened. The one-third-of-workforce threshold was abolished, thus STW can now apply even to a single worker, provided s/he undergoes a wage reduction of at least 10%. Moreover, applications for STW are no longer conditional upon the exhaustion of alternative measures; • Extension of the legal length of STW from 6 to 18 months;
• BA takes charge of 50% of social contributions, which raises to 100% after 6 months of length or if the firm provides training measures 17 ;
• Inclusion of TAW.
Not surprisingly, the year 2009 marked one of the highest peaks of use of STW in the post-war history of Germany (Brenke et al 2010) . Arguably, the relaxation of access rules to Kurzarbeit contributed to this result. As Eichhorst and Marx (2009) 
Austria
In the initial phase of the crisis the use of Kurzarbeit was very mild, due to its little flexible rules, especially in comparison to functional equivalents, such as suspension arrangements. Following the amendments passed in February 2009, take up rates increased remarkably. Changes were introduced to make STW more appealing especially for small and medium enterprises, on the basis of a joint draft presented by the the employers' main peak organization WKÖ and the trade union federation ÖGB. Main changes consisted in:
• clearer eligibility criteria, to be provided by the Federal Employment Service (AMS);
• basic length extended from 3 to 6 months, with possible further extensions up to 18 months;
• possible variation of working hours between 10% and 90% (previously 80%) of normal working hours; • introduction of a special training subsidy co-financed through the ESF (Kurzabeitshilfe mit Qualifizierung) for employers that offer training courses to their employees during the hours not worked, with the AMS covering up to 60% of expenses. 
Conclusions
This work has highlighted how Austria, Germany and Italy all have strengthened STW in order to buffer the occupational impact of the crisis, no matter what its role within each country's income maintenance system. If we consider its original design, it may well seem that the German and Austrian STW has now become more 'Italian'. Access requirements were loosened, benefit length extended, and costs for firms remarkably decreased (Table 8) . Moreover, all three countries have extended eligibility rules to atypical workers -TAW in particular.
Tab. 8 about here
The Italian case stands out under many respects, however. Given the uneveness of CIG coverage, benefiting large industrial firms and their workers, the massive extension of 'emergency' CIG to the whole production structure made Italian STW a blanket scheme, intended to pursue multiple policy objectives. On the one hand, it serves ersatz industrial policy aims, trying to allow as many firms as possible to remain operational, rather than favouring genuine processes of restructuring and reinvestment. On the other hand, it also seems to depart from social policy aims to embrace a somewhat macroeconomic goal, backing effective demand through a generalized support to household spending capability. By contrast, in Germany and Austria STW by and large maintained its specific function of hoarding skilled labour within firms in order to sustain the competitiveness of the economic system during and after the crisis. Such functional specialization is arguably possible in these countries given the complementary role of Kurzarbeit vis-à-vis UB and social assistance schemes within an articulated income protection system. In Italy, this interplay is encumbered by the fact that CIG exerts a substitutive function in place of a skimpy unemployment compensation system and missing social assistance.
It follows that our initial research question -whether the magnitude of the crisis actually produced policy convergence among STW schemes in Italy, Germany and Austria -calls for a multiple answer. From a programme-centred point of view, looking at governance rules and institutional characteristics of STW schemes, the answer is yes: all three countries introduced remarkable innovations, and path-breaking policy changes in Austria and Germany made their STW schemes at least partially converging towards an 'Italian' design. From a systemic perspective however, considering the role of STW schemes within the larger system of income protection, programmelevel convergence gives way to rather differentiated trajectories of development which tend to reinforce existing divergencies between Germany and Austria, on the one hand, and Italy on the other. Despite the extraordinary opportunity window provided by the crisis, Italy's social policy innovations have been strongly path-dependent. New schemes function in the same way as the old STW ones, eschewing the introduction (or the extension) of social rights to favour, yet again, particularism and fragmentation as the hallmark of the Italian welfare state. 
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